
Militaries and governments are redefining space sovereignty, moving from owning satellites and spectrum toward controlling how their data travels across shared and commercial networks.
Few nations can own every satellite they need, so many reserve commercial capacity while keeping control of their traffic.
“Where my conversations have mostly gone is around sovereign data ownership,” said Steve Mills, vice president of global government strategy at Eutelsat Group. “The user, knowing that they’re going to be using a shared or commercial platform, wants to start dictating how their data is controlled across that platform.”
“Sovereignty and resilience are not interchangeable terms. They ultimately answer different questions,” said Group Captain Ben Sharp, space strategy and plans lead at the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). “Sovereignty, can I choose in order to retain freedom of action? Resilience, can I continue in the face of the threats? And assurance, can I trust that I will actually be delivered what it is that I need?”
Mills said Germany’s armed forces bought 100% of OneWeb’s capacity over Ukraine and gave it to the Ukrainians.
“They are managing their own terminals, so they only know where their terminals are. They dictate absolutely who is using the system across their geography and how their data is transferred back to them,” he said.
France and its defense procurement agency, the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA), have since followed suit.
Paris now owns part of the network’s spectrum and reserves capacity. He said many other European nations have signed up for reserved capacity, while the High North draws wide interest, including from NATO, as users seek to cut reliance on submarine cables.
Sharp, a former director of the MoD’s space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) program, said the UK takes an “own, collaborate, access” approach. It is building its own ISR satellites, adding data from allies and buying commercial imagery at scale.
“If I only have one source of ISR data, I will not have the sovereignty and the resilience that I require. If I own my source, I may have the sovereignty element, but I may not have the resilience,” he said. “Equally, if my only source is a commercial provider, I may have the access and scale, but I may lack the freedom of action I require.”
The UK Space Strategy, published in September, sets out the intent to deliver sovereign, nationally separable space capabilities where required and to build resilience through diverse, integrated architectures.
Orders of magnitude
The comments came during a panel on sovereignty and resilience at the Defence in Space Conference 2026 (DiSC 2026) in London on October 27. The two-day event is organized by and for the space and defense industry. Andy Rayner, vice president for international growth at ASTRION, moderated the panel.
Commander Martin Hellmann of the German Cyber and Information Domain Service said Germany has fewer than 10 military satellites today.
“By the end of the decade we want to come to a hybrid, holistic space architecture with close to 1,000. So we’re not speaking about factors. We’re speaking about orders of magnitude,” he said.
The SATCOMBw Stage 4 military communications constellation alone will have over 500 satellites, needing about 100 replacements a year.
German satellite procurement used to take 10 to 12 years, with technical requirements fixed at the start. That suits a tank or a frigate, but not satellites or cyber systems.
“If I acquired my satellites like this, it would be like when iPhone one came out, and I would start the procurement process. About 10 years later, for the 18th birthday of my son, I would give him that very iPhone one and say, ‘Son, I know you want an iPhone. Here you are, but be careful. You have to use that for the next 15 years,’” Hellmann said.
He said Germany procured ISR services under its SPOCK 1 radar satellite program within a year. The contract was signed at the end of 2025 after approval by Germany’s parliament, which must clear any purchase above €25 million, and data has flowed to the army since October 1.
“Time is the leading argument for procurement currently. A 70% solution now is better than a 100% solution by 2035,” he said.
Germany has earmarked €35 billion for military space by 2030 and wants 5,000 military space personnel by then. Hellmann said money is not the only constraint, as industry must move from building a few satellites a decade to hundreds within years.
“You also need the people, the experts who actually work on that, and they don’t scale up like you can buy new factories and new machinery,” he said.
Germany’s military has handed some procurement to its civil space agency, which funds small firms and startups in stages.
Mills said he worries that alliances will not hold under pressure. He compared the push for coalitions with the 2020 pandemic, when Canadian provinces, US states and European nations each set their own rules on borders and vaccines.
“Would the White House and SpaceX restrict access to all of the Starlink constellation in favor of the US Department of War? Probably yes,” he said. “Will all of the contributing nations [in the EU’s GovSatCom] put their sovereign need above that of their contribution into joint capability? Would they pull it and keep it for themselves? Yes, they probably would.”
Resilience is not enough
“Any single system isn’t resilient regardless of how well you design it. While individually these systems may be strong, we’re missing the ability to flexibly move between those systems at the speed of battle,” said James DeBroeck, satellite communications planner at US European Command (USEUCOM).
He said his team is working with US Space Command, the Space Force and Space Systems Command on a “system of systems” that can restore communications quickly and, ideally, draw on spectrum and intelligence data.
For now, the team is still struggling to make it work on a case-by-case basis.
Ben Pigsley, president and CEO of US Electrodynamics Inc (USEI), said ground systems are usually the last part of an architecture to be designed, even though they matter just as much as satellites.
Recent kinetic strikes in the Middle East hit ground systems, but partnerships across the ground industry let operators move customers fairly quickly.
Paul Tedman, managing director of European space at Anduril Industries and a former commander of UK Space Command, said resilience alone is too defensive.
“We over-index on resilience quite a lot. Resilience is more of a defensive posture that assumes that we’re going to absorb a first move against our architectures,” he said. “We’ve also got to be able to protect and defend our architectures, not just absorb threats against them, and that means also holding adversary systems at risk.”
Hellmann said the same applies in cyberspace. Open standards that let Germany work with allies and commercial systems also widen its exposure, as the 2022 cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT network showed. Germany is also building rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) satellites as a deterrent.
“We have defensive cyber operations, but we’ll also have to look into offensive cyber operations,” he said.
Tedman backed Rupert Pearce, the UK’s National Armaments Director (NAD), on an outcomes-based approach. He said governments should set outcomes and let industry propose solutions, since much of the innovation now sits in the commercial sector.
“You don’t necessarily need to list a whole range of prescriptive requirements, but you can say, how would you do it? That really fuels innovation,” he said.
He also urged the NAD to accept more operational risk and move money freely across programs as priorities emerge.
Sharp said the UK will keep defining the level of national control and disruption it needs before it buys, so industry can deliver measurable outcomes rather than respond to aspirations.


