Low-cost uncrewed systems facing jammed and spoofed satellite navigation should combine every positioning signal they can afford, since no single technology can protect them.
Jamming blocks signals outright. Spoofing is harder to catch because it feeds a receiver false data that looks genuine.
“Having a confidently incorrect position is definitely much worse than knowing when you’re uncertain,” said Giorgio Taylor, director of business development for the UK and Europe at Xona Space Systems.
He said GPS alone is rarely a pragmatic basis for a positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) system. Authenticated signals help counter spoofing, while stronger ones let a platform get closer to a jammer before relying on inertial sensors.
"In general, more is more. The more signals that you have, the easier it is to spot the liars," said Dan Sola, CEO of Archangel Autonomy. "A lot of those non-cooperative signals are doing other jobs and are essentially not roped into the same schema of deception."
“Position accuracy is the easiest thing to measure, so that tends to get the most focus,” Sola said. “Mission success is clearly the thing that has to be the focus for making an informed procurement decision, standing up in a legal review and defending your decisions, and being effective on the front line.”
Archangel tracks more than 50 navigation methods, most of them not space-based.
Dr Michael L. O’Connor, executive vice president of the PNT division at Iridium Communications, said there is no silver bullet because different missions have different requirements and must trade integrity against performance and cost.
“Ultimately, you need at least three watches to reliably tell what time it is. If two of them agree and one doesn't, you can be pretty sure the two that agree show the true time. That applies very accurately to navigation.”
Andy Lincoln, chief engineer at Viasat, said jamming is relatively easy to detect. A receiver normally tracks four or five satellites, and if that number falls to three or two, it is probably being jammed.
“If you use an insecure signal like L1, which is the granddaddy of GNSS (global navigation satellite system) signals, that’s so easy to jam and to spoof, and it’s very hard to detect. Something like L5 is better because it’s a more modern signal. It’s got more protections built in.”
He said platforms need enough modern signals, tied to inertial and vision systems, to tell whether a spoofed position is drifting or jumping off course. A platform that cannot trust its fix has to abort the mission.
Borrowed signals carry risks
The comments came during a panel on how low-cost uncrewed systems can access assured PNT at the Defence in Space Conference 2026 in London on October 27. The two-day event is organized by and for the space and defense industry. Andy Proctor, managing director of RethinkPNT, moderated the panel.
Signals of opportunity come from systems such as satellite communications (satcom) networks that were never designed for navigation. A receiver that understands the signals and knows the satellites’ orbits can work out its own position from them.
“You have no contractual relationship with whoever’s sending that signal. They might change something and mess up your PNT solution without any advance notice,” Lincoln said.
He said such signals are better than nothing but best kept for contingency and emergency use.
O’Connor said non-participating signals are more exposed to spoofing than navigation-built signals. Low Earth orbit (LEO) is about 25 times closer to Earth than a standard GNSS orbit, giving a much stronger signal.
“Really advanced security can be built into that signal to ensure that when you receive that signal from the satellite, you know that it came from that satellite and not from an attacker. Most users would say that integrity, if it’s affordable, is worth it.”
Taylor said signals of opportunity help most when they use a part of the spectrum that is not being jammed. But satcom terminals themselves still carry GNSS chips to work out their location and timing.
“It’s pretty crazy how big the dependence is on GPS in systems where you wouldn’t even expect it to live.”
Jamming is now a concern in orbit too. Academic researchers in the US have published papers on jamming in space, while many spacecraft launched before such interference was expected still carry GPS receivers.
Lincoln said most Viasat satellites sit in geosynchronous orbit, above the GNSS constellations, and track time with onboard oscillators and position with star trackers. Using about a dozen dispersed ground stations, Viasat can locate its ViaSat-3 satellites to within 10 cm in a few seconds.
O’Connor said he and a co-founder began building a LEO PNT service about 10 years ago at Satelles, now part of Iridium, designed from the start not to depend on GPS.
“At the time we were explaining to people why we needed alternate PNT, and the answer was, ‘Well, we have GPS. Why would we need an alternate?’ It turns out 10 years later the world did figure out that that was needed.”
“Having the same point of failure in a different PNT constellation as GPS is really a suboptimal risk. We’re not trying to make GPS a bit better,” Taylor said.
Price comes first
“I don’t think there’s a single answer to ‘is it cheap enough?’ Certain missions obviously justify a more expensive solution for a high-value platform on a high-value mission,” Sola said.
He said many drones are now so cheap, with lifespans of hours or minutes, that they cannot justify significant navigation spending. Ukraine alone is producing and using up millions of them a year. The country produced more than 4 million drones in 2025.
He added that size, weight and power (SWaP) limits matter, but cost usually bites first.
Lincoln said platforms should first ask how much quality they can afford, which depends on the platform’s cost and mission sensitivity.
“The receiver side doesn’t have to be the expense it traditionally has been. You can focus on what’s available, what’s deployable, what’s available at scale, and start there.”
Some phone chipsets can be reprogrammed to receive L5, and low-cost chips handling both GNSS and LEO signals already exist.
O’Connor said the more signals a platform has, the more resilient it can be, as long as they are affordable. Units combining GNSS, LEO PNT and inertial measurement units are already in the field.
“One of the greatest risks we have is just not implementing solutions today. The key is don’t wait for perfection. The real risk is that we need to be able to fight tonight, and we don’t know when that moment is going to be, but we better be ready for it.”
Lincoln said engineers learn most by taking systems into the field rather than perfecting them in the lab.
Sola said the fastest turnaround Archangel has seen, from a user request through development and automated testing to a deployed software update, was 26 minutes. He compared that with about two software updates over a Eurofighter’s lifetime, adding that this is no criticism, as the two are very different.
“When you are making decisions about space infrastructure, which obviously has a rather different time horizon to pay back than 26 minutes, there is some element of taking a bet on the future.”
An audience member asked about shifting time slightly at a data center to enable later sabotage.
“If somebody can spoof time, they can create real damages in financial markets and stock exchanges, where high-frequency traders that can manipulate time by a little bit can start to do insider trading activities,” O’Connor said.
Lincoln said electrical systems, data centers and other infrastructure at fixed locations need only time, not position. Several resilient time-transfer services already exist, including ones from Iridium and Viasat, and the aim is to get enough independent sources to cross-check one another at an affordable cost.



