Dual-Use Satellites Drive Surge in Space-Based Threats
Military and civil leaders warn that hostile interference in satellite networks could cost billions and disrupt daily life worldwide
Space-based systems underpin military operations, financial transactions, and global communications. But these critical assets are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.
Emerging threats—from cyberattacks and orbital debris to hostile actions by foreign states—have turned satellites into strategic targets. With everyday infrastructure relying on space, resilience is no longer optional.
"Space underpins everything we do," said Major General Chris Fogarty, Chief of Staff, UK Space Command. "Even a single army brigade has over 2,500 touchpoints with the space ecosystem."
Disruption to space services could ripple across logistics, aviation, finance, and emergency response. From GPS-enabled delivery fleets to satellite-timed financial trades, outages would be felt instantly. A single day without satellite navigation could cost the UK economy £1 billion.
Yet many sectors remain unaware of just how dependent they are on space. A persistent "space blindness" across critical industries means few organizations have contingency plans for satellite failure.
The problem is not only technical but cultural. Planners account for fire drills and flood recovery, but often ignore satellite outages.
National Security Risks
Speaking at the UK Space Conference 2025 in Manchester on July 16, Fogarty outlined how space threats are rapidly evolving.
Fogarty used the Ukraine war as a cautionary example, pointing to Russia's anti-satellite missile test in 2021 and the subsequent cyberattack on satellite ground terminals. That attack affected not just Ukrainian command and control systems, but also 5,800 wind turbines in Germany, disrupting 11 gigawatts of power.
"That was the first shot of the war—and it was fired in space," Fogarty said.
He described a range of counter-space threats, including electronic jamming, laser dazzling, directed energy weapons, and kinetic attacks via orbital platforms.
"Adversaries are growing their counterspace capabilities at an alarming rate," he warned.
These capabilities span the threat spectrum. At the low end are electronic warfare methods with limited attribution, such as jamming or interfering with radio frequencies. At the high end are kinetic attacks that can completely destroy satellites.
Fogarty noted that direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons and co-orbital systems are no longer science fiction, but demonstrated capabilities.
Harshbir Sangha, Director of Missions and Capabilities at the UK Space Agency, echoed the concern from the civil sector perspective, highlighting the explosion in satellite numbers—from 11,000 today to 50,000 in the coming years, then to a projected 200,000 within a decade. Debris, solar flares, and hostile maneuvers all raise the stakes.
"Protecting our infrastructure in space is as important as launching it," he said.
He emphasized that solar flares, while spectacular to witness on Earth, pose real dangers to satellite electronics and services. Events like the recent geomagnetic storm, which made auroras visible across the UK, are beautiful—but potentially disruptive.
Toward National Resilience
To address these risks, UK stakeholders are developing a multi-pronged approach. The National Space Operations Centre (NSpOC), a joint initiative between the UK Space Agency and the UK Space Command, monitors orbital activity in real-time.
Additionally, the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) Cell harnesses data from over 700 global sensors, including private citizen telescopes.
Fogarty also pointed to ongoing training efforts: "In the military, we're embedding space education at all levels—from officers to soldiers—to build reversionary skills."
Training now includes contingency planning for GPS denial and electromagnetic interference.
Meanwhile, Sangha said the UK Space Agency offers support services, such as cybersecurity consultancy and digital twin simulations, to help organizations improve their preparedness.
"We reached over 70 organizations last year with direct support," he added. "This includes offering three-day cybersecurity consulting packages at no cost."
The government is also reevaluating regulatory frameworks to keep pace with innovation.
Sangha, who oversees UK satellite licensing, said: "We're looking at ways to build risk mitigation into the earliest phases of mission design."
In addition, partnerships with the European Space Agency (ESA) are underway to develop missions, such as Vigil, which will enhance the monitoring of solar activity and space weather. These systems, while unable to prevent solar flares, can offer advanced warnings that help mitigate impacts.
Fogarty noted the increasing role of commercial players in both civil and defense missions. He highlighted the integration of commercial Earth observation data and commercial launch services as critical enablers of the UK's space strategy.
"We can’t do this without industry. The agility and innovation they bring are vital," he said.
Sangha concurred, adding that many UK companies are contributing to the development of dual-use technologies that serve both civilian and defense objectives.
"We’re seeing significant interest in space security startups," he said. The agency is working closely with academia to ensure talent pipelines meet this rising demand.
Bridging Sectors, Building Awareness
Both speakers emphasized that collaboration across government, business, and academia is essential.
"It's not down to the Space Agency or the Ministry of Defence (MOD) alone," said Sangha. "Resilience is a collective effort."
Yet awareness remains a challenge.
"Many people still ask if the UK has a space agency," he remarked. Public understanding of space's role in daily life is limited—a problem that could undermine preparedness.
Fogarty agreed, stressing that resilience planning cannot be confined to specialist communities.
"Your business continuity plan can't just be about a fire in the building. It has to include a day without space," he said.
The concept of a "Day Without Space" highlights the UK's growing dependence on space infrastructure for various sectors, including defense, the economy, and everyday life. UK Space Command is working to ensure the safety, security, and sustainability of space activities, recognizing the potential for disruption and the need for resilience.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of industry-wide tabletop exercises, such as the upcoming national security simulation scheduled for later this year. This exercise will expand on the lessons from "Day Without Space" and introduce new threat models for multi-agency collaboration.
"We must move from discussion to implementation," Fogarty said. "Space control begins with space domain awareness, and that requires everyone to engage."
Building the Future of Resilience
Looking ahead, both the UK Space Agency and Space Command are focused on turning awareness into action. Sangha explained that innovation and security must advance together: "As we deploy more satellites, we must also develop protocols to defend them."
Efforts to simplify and accelerate licensing procedures are also intended to allow earlier identification of high-risk missions.
"We want to ensure mitigation measures aren't an afterthought," Sangha said.
Fogarty added that part of long-term security is cultivating space fluency across all sectors. That means not just knowing what space systems do, but planning alternatives.
"We need reversionary methods, we need redundancy, and we need readiness," he said.
The executive summary from "Day Without Space" will be published in the coming months. While it will contain no classified material, it will serve as a wake-up call to both policymakers and industry leaders.
"The next attack on the UK could likely come through space," Sangha warned. "We must act now to build resilience across all sectors."
To meet these rising challenges, the UK will need a national strategy that makes space resilience a pillar of security planning. This means investing in public education, funding next-generation space protection technologies, and integrating orbital security into every level of crisis response and management.
The space domain is no longer an abstract frontier—it is infrastructure, and it must be defended as such.